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Abstract	Van	Fraassen’s	Scientific	Representation:	Paradoxes	of	Perspective	presents	a	structural	empiricist	approach	to	scientific	representation.	As	he	notes,	in	order	to	pin	that	representation	down	to	an	actual	situation,	we	must	supplement	our	‘God-like’	reflections	on	the	structure	with	some	further	specifying	feature.	In	this	essay	I	consider	what	that	further	feature	might	be,	across	a	range	of	circumstances,	from	those	having	to	do	with	the	Semantic	Approach	in	general,	to	the	characterisation	of	structural	realism	and,	finally,	to	the	challenge	set	by	van	Fraassen	in	the	form	of	the	‘Appearances	from	Reality’	criterion	in	the	context	of	quantum	mechanics.	I	agree	with	van	Fraassen	that	having	to	introduce	some	such	feature	is	no	threat	to	the	structuralist	project	in	general,	whether	in	realist	or	empiricist	guise	but	would	maintain	that	the	realist	also	has	the	resources	to	satisfy	the	above	criterion.	The	issue	then	is	whether	such	further	resources	should	be	taken	to	be	a	constitutive	part	of	the	theory	or	not.	Reflection	on	this	reveals	that	underpinning	this	whole	discussion	is	a	certain	view	of	theories	as	things	that	have	well-defined	identity	conditions	and	in	conclusion	I	suggest	that	dropping	this	demand	will	be	a	liberating	move	in	all	sorts	of	respects.				“Do	you	desire	to	construct	a	vast	and	lofty	fabric?	Think	first	about	the	foundations	of	humility.	The	higher	your	structure	is	to	be,	the	deeper	must	be	its	foundation.”	(St.	Augustine)			
Introduction:	The	Semantic	Approach		It	is	a	truism	to	say	that	yesterday’s	radical	stance	is	today’s	establishment	position	and	many	have	said	this	about	the	‘Semantic	Approach’	to	theories.	Echoing	Suppe	from	over	twenty	years	before	(Suppe	1989),	Halvorson	wrote	that,	‘[w]ithin	a	few	short	decades,	the	Semantic	Approach	has	established	itself	as	the	new	orthodoxy’	(Halvorson,	2012;	see	also	Frigg	2006,	LeBihan	2012).	The	core	claim	of	the	Approach	is	taken	to	be	that		‘…	a	theory	is	[my	emphasis]	a	class	of	models’	(Halvorson	2012	p.	190;	see	also	p.	192).	On	the	basis	of	this	claim	Halvorson	then	goes	on	to	present	examples	of	what	he	calls	theories	that	cannot	be	regarded	in	terms	of	classes	of	models	and	also	models	that	should	not	
be	regarded	as	theories.	As	a	result,	he	concludes	that,		‘…	it	is	impossible	to	formulate	good	identity	criteria	for	theories	when	they	are	considered	as	classes	of	models.	’	(ibid.	p.	190;	see	also	p.	201;	for	a	response	see	Glymour	2013)	and	hence	the	Semantic	Approach	founders.			 The	nature	of	the	above	claim	that	a	theory	is	a	class	of	models	and	the	issue	whether	it	should	be	taken	as	characterising	the	core	of	the	Semantic	Approach	have	of	course	been	contested	for	many	years.	Thus,	thirty	years	ago,	van	Fraassen	wrote,	'...	if	the	theory	as	such,	is	to	be	identified	with	anything	at	all	-	if	theories	are	to	be	reified	-	then	a	theory	should	be	identified	with	its	class	of	models.'	(van	Fraassen	1989,	p.	222).	But	of	course,	that’s	a	big	‘if’!	And	one	can,	indeed	some	would	say,	should,	resist	this	reification	and	instead	take	the	Semantic	Approach	as	just	one	such	approach	that	can	provide	an	array	of	devices	–	in	this	case	set-theoretic	models	–	that	philosophers	can	deploy	to	capture	certain	aspects	of	scientific	practice	(see	da	Costa	and	French	2003;	French	and	Saatsi	2006;	French	forthcomingb).			 Furthermore,	a	crucial	feature	of	that	practice	concerns	the	
representational	role	of	theories.		As	van	Fraassen	also	notes,	when	a	scientist	presents	a	theory	‘…	she	provides	a	class	of	models	for	the	representation	of	those	phenomena’		(van	Fraassen	2014,	p.	277).	He	continues,	‘…	we	properly	speak	of	a	model	of	combustion	or	of	the	San	Francisco	Bay	in	the	way	we	speak	of	a	painting	of	fire	or	of	the	Giaconda.	’	(2014,	p.	277).	Thus,	‘[a]	model	is	a	mathematical	structure	[of	the	kind	considered	by	Halvorson]	in	the	same	sense	that	the	Mona	Lisa	is	a	painted	piece	of	wood.’	(ibid.).	In	other	words,	given	that	a	scientific	model	is	a	representation,	‘…it	does	not	follow	that	the	identity	of	a	theory	can	be	defined	in	terms	of	the	corresponding	set	of	mathematical	structures	without	reference	to	their	representational	function.	’	(ibid.,	p.	278).	As	French	and	Saatsi	noted,	‘[i]t	seems	to	be	a	popular	misconception	of	the	semantic	view	that	it	says	nothing	but	the	following	about	theories:	theories	are	(with	‘is’	of	identity)	just	structures	(models).’	(French	and	Saatsi,	2006,	p.	552).			 Granted	that	this	is	a	misconception,	noting	that	there	is	more	to	a	theory	than	the	mathematical	structure	immediately	raises	the	question:	how	are	we	to	capture	this	representational	function	for	our	purposes	as	philosophers	of	science?	Again	we	can	draw	on	the	resources	of	the	Semantic	Approach	and	characterise	it	formally	in	terms	of	(partial)	isomorphisms	holding	between	the	relevant	structures	(van	Fraassen	and	Stegman	1993;	van	Fraassen	2008).	Such	a	move	has	been	criticised	on	the	grounds	that	such	devices	are	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	representation	(see	Frigg	2006;	Suarez	2010)	but	these	concerns	can	be	met	(Bueno	and	French	2011).	That	they	are	not	necessary	is	argued	for	via	examples,	typically	from	the	world	of	art,	where,	it	is	claimed,	we	have	representation	but	no	isomorphisms	or	structural	similarity	more	generally.	Leaving	aside	the	relevance	of	such	purported	counter-examples	when	it	comes	to	representation	in	science,	Chakravartty	(2001)	has	pointed	out	that	it	cannot	be	the	case	that	similarity	in	general	is	not	necessary	for	scientific	representation,	since	in	the	absence	of	any	similarities	at	all,	it	is	not	clear	how	the	usual	practices	of	interpretation	and	inference	could	get	off	the	ground	to	begin	with.			 As	for	it	not	being	sufficient,	the	argument	is	basically	that	representation	is	asymmetric	–	so	Da	Vinci’s	painting	represents	Lisa	Ghirardini	but	not	vice	versa	–		whereas	(partial)	isomorphisms	are	not;	again,	responses	can	be	sought,	
whether	through	appeals	to	inherent	features	of	the	formal	relation	or	to	‘external’	factors	such	as	the	intentions	of	the	user	of	the	representation	(Bueno	and	French	2011).	Here	my	focus	is	on	the	latter	move,	situated	in	a	broader	context.	Consider	the	further	question:	does	an	appeal	to	intentions	in	such	cases	fatally	undermine	the	Semantic	Approach	or	a	structuralist	account	of	representation	more	generally?	One	might	think	that	it	only	does	so	if	one	insists	that	all	aspects	of	the	relationship	between	theories	and	the	world	have	to	be	understood	structurally.	However,	consider	theory	confirmation:	to	demand	that	a	structuralist	account	be	given	of	that	seems	to	ask	too	much.				 This	is	the	issue	that	I	want	to	consider	here,	understood	in	broader	terms.	What	formal	devices	such	as	partial	structures	and	partial	isomorphisms	and	the	like	provide	us	with	is	the	framework	for	a	structuralist	account	of	scientific	representation.	The	question	now	is,	are	these	structures	enough	in	general?	Many	have	argued	that	they	are	not,	as	I	have	already	indicated.	In	a	sense	I	shall	agree	but	I	want	to	insist	that	the	introduction	of	some	further	element	does	not	undermine	this	sort	of	structuralist	approach	overall.			
The	Act	of	Self-Location		In	his	classic	work	on	scientific	representation	van	Fraassen	adopted	what	has	been	called	his	‘haupsatz’,	namely	that	‘[t[here	is	no	representation	except	in	the	sense	that	some	things	are	used,	made	or	taken,	to	represent	some	things	as	thus	or	so’	(2008,	p.	23).	Here	we	see	such	a	non-structural	element	being	introduced,	namely	the	user	of	the	representation.	Is	this	fatal	to	the	structuralist	project	of	capturing,	in	the	above	terms,	scientific	theories	and	their	representational	function?	One	might	balk	at	the	claim	that	it	does.	After	all,	the	structure,	as	presented	above	in	terms	of	mathematical	structures	that	are	by	their	very	nature	abstract	and	general,	must	be	effectively	pinned	down	so	that	it	can	be	said	to	apply	to	the	particular	situation	under	consideration.	As	van	Fraassen	himself	puts	it,	‘[t]he	user	must	leave	the	God-like	reflections	on	the	structure	…	behind	in	order	to	apply	the	implications	of	those	reflections	to	his	or	her	actual	situation’	(2008,	p.	71).	This	application,	he	suggest,	must	involve	an	essential	act	of	self-location	akin	to	the	indicating	element	of	a	map	that	says	‘You	are	here’.			 This	comparison	with	maps	and	models	been	made	before,	of	course,	and	one	must	be	careful	not	to	make	too	much	of	it.	It	is	(typically)	not	the	case	that	a	scientist	is	simply	given	a	theory	in	the	way	in	which	an	orienteer,	for	example,	is	handed	a	map	and	told	to	find	her	way	to	some	location,	which	of	course	requires	her	to	know	from	where	she	is	starting.	Leaving	aside	the	Kuhnian	point	about	the	education	of	scientists,	they	don’t	approach	theories	as	one	does	a	map,	as	a	tool	via	which	one	can	orient	oneself	in	an	unfamiliar	landscape.	A	theory	is	an	element	or	feature	of	the	relevant	scientific	practice	–		it	is	part	of	the	environment	in	which	the	scientist	lives.	Asking	her	where	she	stands	with	regard	to	the	theory	will	surely	result	in	the	same	bemused	expression	as	obtained	when	asking	someone	where	they	are	within	their	home	neighbourhood!		 Of	course,	it	might	be	pressed	that	this	is	just	to	push	the	argument	back	a	stage	and	that	at	some	point	some	representation	has	to	be	produced	towards	which	the	scientist	must	orient	herself.	This	could	lead	us	into	deeper	waters	
than	we	might	be	comfortable	paddling	in	here	so	let	us	keep	our	attention	on	theoretical	models,	such	as	we	find	in	Einstein’s	Special	Relativity,	for	example.	As	van	Fraassen	points	out,	if	we	are	to	use	this	theory	to	predict	what	happens	to	an	electrically	charged	body	in	motion,	say,	then	some	choice	of	coordinate	system	related	to	a	physical	frame	of	reference	is	required.	LeavIng	the	God-like	reflections	on	the	structure	of	space-time	behind	in	order	to	apply	those	reflections	to	the	actual	situation,	or,	in	other	words,	for	the	representation	to	be	
used,	something	must	be	done	that	pins	down	the	relevant	structure	to	that	situation.	The	connection	between	this	choice	of	reference	frame	and	the	orientation	of	the	scientist	touched	on	above	can	be	found	in	Weyl’s	famous	characterisation	of	coordinate	systems	as	‘the	unavoidable	residuum	of	the	ego’s	annihilation’	(quoted	by	van	Fraassen	in	2008,	p.	71;	for	discussion	of	the	phenomenological	underpinnings	of	this	phrase,	see	Ryckman	2005).			 As	van	Fraassen	goes	on	to	note,	such	acts	of	self-location	provide	the	conditions	for	relating	theoretical	models	to	specific	empirical	situations	in	general	(2008,	p.	87).	And	as	we’ll	see,	this	becomes	particularly	pertinent	in	the	case	of	that	second	great	revolution	in	physics	in	the	twentieth	century,	namely	Quantum	Mechanics	and	the	infamous	‘measurement	problem’.	Before	we	get	there,	however,	let’s	consider	measurement	more	generally.		
Measurement	as	Representation		Consider	yet	another	question:	what	sorts	of	interactions	in	general	count	as	
measurements?	Clearly	the	outcome	of	a	measurement	must	represent	the	target	in	a	certain	fashion,	in	the	sense	of	selectively	resembling	it	at	a	certain	level	of	abstraction,	according	to	the	theory.	This	constitutes	the	representation	criterion	and,	again,	as	van	Fraassen	puts	it,	‘[t]he	outcome	provides	a	representation	of	the	measured	item,	but	also	represents	it	as	thus	or	so.’	(van	Fraassen	2008,	p.	180).	An	illustrative	example	(for	my	purposes	at	least)	is	provided	by	the	images	of	collision	events	in	particle	detectors,	such	as	those	that	yielded	evidence	for	the	existence	of	the	Higgs	boson	at	CERN,	for	example	(see	Garutti	2012).	Here	we	might	see	a	flash	on	the	particle	detector	screen	or	computer	generated	lines	whereby	the	particle	under	investigation	is	represented	as	an	object	and	is	granted,	by	virtue	of	being	spatio-temporally	located,	at	least	for	that	instant,	what	Toraldo	di	Francia	called	a	kind	of	‘pseudo-individuality’	(Toraldo	di	Francia	1978).			 Why	‘pseudo-‘?	Well,	when	we	try	to	project	that	particular	representation	beyond	the	measurement	situation,	as	embodied	in	the	particle	detectors,	we	effectively	bump	up	against	quantum	mechanics	and	must	metaphysically	accommodate,	in	particular,	the	implications	of	Fermi-Dirac	and	Bose-Einstein	statistics	(other	kinds	–	the	so-called	parastatistics	–	are	also	theoretically	possible	and	we’ll	come	back	to	those	shortly).	As	is	well-known,	the	likes	of	Born	and	Heisenberg	(and	others)	took	these	statistics	and	the	way	that	permutations	of	the	particles	appeared	to	be	treated	within	the	formalism	as	implying	that	quantum	particles	must	be	regarded	as	non-individuals	in	some	sense	(for	details,	both	historical	and	formal,	see	French	and	Krause	2006).	Cassirer	and	Eddington	then	took	this,	in	turn,	to	imply	that	the	particles	could	not	be	treated	as	objects	at	all	and	should	be	regarded	as	mere	‘nodes’	in	the	relevant	structure	(Cassirer	1936;	Eddington	1928).	However,	van	Fraassen,	
Huggett,	Redhead	and	French	all	argued	that	these	quantum	statistics	are	in	fact	also	compatible	with	regarding	the	particles	as	individuals	(by	virtue	of	a	different	interpretation	of	particle	permutations;	see	French	and	Redhead	1988;	Huggett	1999;	van	Fraassen	1989).	With	Krause	arguing	that	non-individuality	can	be	formally	characterised	via	quasi-set	theory	without	abandoning	the	view	of	the	particles	as	objects,	that	connection	with	structuralism	was	broken.	In	its	place,	Ladyman	argued	that	it	is	the	metaphysical	underdetermination	that	results	from	these	developments	–	between	particles-as-individuals	and	particles-as-non-individuals	–	that	represents	a	challenge	for	realism	(see	also	van	Fraassen	1989)	and	that	this	challenge	could	be	met,	and	the	underdetermination	broken,	by	shifting	from	an	object-oriented	metaphysics	to	‘ontic	structural	realism’	(Ladyman	1998;	French	2014).			
Realism	(of	a	Structural	Kind)	
	In	his	critique	mentioned	above,	Halvorson	claims	that	structural	realism	actually	derives	its	plausibility	from	the	Semantic	Approach	and	suggests	that,	given	his	criticism	of	the	latter,	‘…	structural	realism	is	no	more	plausible	today	than	it	was	in	the	time	of	Carnap	and	Hempel.	’	(2013,	p.	476).	However,	although	Ladyman	(1998)	did	acknowledge	that	the	Semantic	Approach	might	be	preferred	by	the	structural	realist	because,	in	effect,	it	wears	its	structuralist	colours	on	its	sleeve,	Worrall’s	so-	called	‘epistemic’	form	of	structural	realism	was	explicitly	couched	in	terms	of	the	alternative		‘Syntactic	Approach’	that	characterises	theories	in	terms	of	sets	of	propositions,	closed	under	some	(typically	classical)	logic	(Worrall	1989).	Furthermore,	Bain	and	Landry	have	argued	that	category	theory	is	in	fact	a	better	framework	for	the	structural	realist	to	adopt	(Bain	2013;	Landry	2007;	for	criticisms	see	Lam	and	Wuthrich	2015)	and	French	has	acknowledged	that	the	structuralist	has	a	variety	of	meta-representational	options	to	choose	from	(see	French	2014	Ch.	5).	Thus	the	ties	with	the	Semantic	Approach	are	looser	than	Halvorson	suggests!		 Furthermore,	historically	and	currently,	there	were	multiple	motivations	for	structural	realism,	from	which	it	can	be	said	to	derive	its	plausibility.	For	Worrall	(1989)	and	Saunders	(1993)	the	motivation	was	accommodating	theory	change	and	responding	to	the	challenge	set	by	Laudan,	for	example.	For	Cassirer	and	Eddington,	the	motivation	for	their	neo-Kantian	and	‘subjective’	structuralisms,	respectively,	had	more	to	do	with	accommodating	what	theories	of	modern	physics,	such	as	General	Relativity	and	Quantum	Mechanics,	appear	to	tell	us.		Similarly	for	French	(2014)	and	Ladyman	(1998),	there	is	a	significant	emphasis	on	accommodating	the	role	that	certain	symmetry	principles	play	in	today’s	particle	physics,	including,	of	course,	the	Permutation	Symmetry	that	lies	behind	the	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	mentioned	above.	For	them,	the	significance	of	this	role	tells	us	something	important	about	the	world,	whereas	for	van	Fraassen,	of	course,	as	a	structural	empiricist,	it	tells	us	something	about	science.		 And	what	it	tells	us,	I	would	maintain,	is	that	the	world,	conceived	as	structure,	should	be	understood,	following	Cassirer,	as	akin	to	a	Parmenidean	‘well-rounded’	sphere	in	which	symmetries,	laws	and,	crucially,	measurement	outcomes	are	all	interlocked		(French	2014).	The	contents	of	those	(possible)	measurement	outcomes	constitute	what	van	Fraassen	calls	the		‘appearances’	
and	here	again	we	return	to	the	overall	theme	of	this	essay:	these	outcomes	function	as	what	Wilson	calls	the	‘existential	witnesses’	(Wilson	2017)	that	‘pin	down’	the	structure	of	the	world,	as	indicated	above,	to	that	which	is	applicable	to	our	situation.	So,	consider	quantum	statistics	yet	again:	Permutation	Symmetry	yields	a	range	of	possible	statistical	kinds,	as	again	already	indicated,	including	not	just	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	but	also	an	infinite	variety	of	parastatistics	(the	application	of	these	to	particle	physics	played	a	crucial	role	in	the	development	of	quantum	chromodynamics).	However,	we	appear	to	occupy	only	the	bosonic	and	fermionic	sectors	of	Hilbert	space	and	not	any	of	the	parastatistics	ones,	so	the	structure	of	the	world	is	one	that	manifests	bosonic	and	fermionic	behaviour	and	in	that	sense	is	‘pinned	down’	to	those	sectors.			 Recalling	what	was	touched	on	above	about	indexicality	and	what	van	Fraassen	calls	the	Act	of	Self-Location,	it	appears	that	here	too	we	have	the	insertion	of	an	apparently	non-structural	feature	into	our	structuralist	picture	that	effectively	says	‘we	are	here!’	(in	Hilbert	space).	Does	that	self-locating	move	undermine	the	structuralist	enterprise?	No	–	that	aspect	of	the	structure	of	the	world	that	incorporates	Permutation	Symmetry	allows	for	a	range	of	possibilities	and	in	order	to	talk	about	the	structure	of	this	world	we	need	to	specify	which	of	those	possibilities	is	actualised.	As	in	the	case	of	theory	confirmation,	the	specification	of	the	actual	world	from	an	array	of	possibilities	should	not	itself	be	up	for	structuralist	interpretation.			 Acknowledging	that	we	have	more	structural	resources	on	hand	than	we	need	to	represent	the	actual	world	also	has	obvious	implications	for	discussions	of	modality	in	science.	For	the	structural	realist,	the	world,	as	structure,	can	be	regarded	as	inherently	modal,	offering,	perhaps,	an	alternative	to	the	Humean	and	dispositionalist	accounts	of	laws	and	symmetries	(see	Berenstain	and	Ladyman	2012;	French	2014).	For	the	empiricist,	any	modality	is	to	be	understood	as	‘in’	the	models;	that	is,	as	simply	a	reflection	of	the	fact	that,	as	just	stated,	the	mathematical	characterisation	of	Permutation	Symmetry	allows	for	a	number	of	possibilities.	In	either	case,	acknowledging	this	feature	allows	us	to	further	extend	our	explorations	of	the	resources	that	are	made	available	in	the	context	of	modern	physics.			 Nevertheless,	structural	realism	faces	a	further	serious	challenge,	which	again	illuminates	the	theme	of	how	we	‘pin	down’	our	structural	commitments	and	is	presented	by	van	Fraassen	as	follows.			
Challenge:	The	Appearance	from	Reality	Criterion		According	to	van	Fraassen,	the	realist	must	be	committed	to	the	claim	that	the	scientific	representation	of	nature	should	include	the	appearances	by	showing	how	they	are	‘produced	as	a	proper	part	of	the	depicted	reality’	(van	Fraassen	2008	p.	281).	Here	he	quotes	Leplin:	‘A	theory	is	not	simply	an	empirical	law	or	generalization	to	the	effect	that	certain	observable	phenomena	occur,	but	an	explanation	of	their	occurrence	that	provides	some	mechanism	to	produce	them,	or	some	deeper	principles	to	which	their	production	is	reducible.’	(Leplin	1997).	Thus	what	is	required	is	an	explanation	that	takes	us	from	the	relevant	feature	of	the	theory,	as	explanans,	to	the	appearances,	as	explanandum,	that	allows	us	to	
grasp	how	the	latter	is	‘produced’	by	the	former;	or	as	van	Fraassen	puts	it,	‘[t]he	appearances	are	to	be	explained	as	produced	in	the	world	depicted	by	fundamental	physics.’	(2008,	p.	282).	Here,	then,	is	the	challenge	for	the	structural	realist:	can	the	relevant	symmetries,	such	as	Permutation	Symmetry,	act	as	these	‘deeper	principles’	and	function	as	the	explanans	in	an	explanation	of	the	relevant	appearances?			 I	think	the	answer	to	that	question	is	‘yes’	and	so	the	challenge	can	be	met.	Consider	the	following	phenomenon:	white	dwarf	stars	are	the	final	evolutionary	stage	of	stars	that	are	not	sufficiently	massive	to	form	neutron	stars	and	that	stage	is	reached	when	the	gravitational	collapse	of	the	star	is	halted	by	electron	degeneracy	‘pressure’.	The	explanation	for	that	‘halting’	of	the	collapse	appeals	to	the	Pauli	Exclusion	Principle	which	prevents	electrons	from	occupying	the	same	state	(where	their	state	encompasses	not	only	their	energy	but	also	their	spin).	How	the	Exclusion	Principle,	viewed	as	a	constraint	on	electron	occupancy,	can	act	as	an	explanans	in	this	case	has	been	a	matter	of	some	dispute	(Lewis	1986;	Skow	2014).	However,	French	and	Saatsi	(2018)	have	argued	that	we	can	accommodate	this	case	within	Woodward’s	‘counterfactual-dependence’	account	of	explanation,	in	which	the	core	idea	is	that	symmetries	play	a	role	in	explanatory	arguments	that	is	comparable	to	that	of	a	contingent	initial	or	boundary	condition	in	causal	explanations.	Thus,	a	symmetry	fact	together	with	an	appropriate	connection	between	that	fact	and	the	explanandum	can	provide	‘what-if-things-had-been-different’	information,	thereby	showing	how	an	explanandum	depends	on	the	symmetry.	Although	this	counterfactual-dependence	view	of	explanation	has	been	largely	developed	in	the	context	of	causal	dependence,	in	recent	years	it	has	been	extended	to	various	kinds	of	non-causal	dependencies	(see,	for	example,	Jansson	and	Saatsi	2019;	Saatsi	2018)	and	many	symmetry	explanations	are	likewise	naturally	construed	as	being	non-causal.		 Of	course,	there	remains	the	issue	of	the	kind	of	dependence	involved	if	it	is	non-causal	and	this	bears	on	van	Fraassen’s	insistence	that	the	appearances	must	be	explained	as	produced	in	the	world	–	clearly	when	it	comes	to	symmetries	the	mode	of	production	must	go	beyond	the	causal	or	‘mechanistic’	in	Leplin’s	terms.	Here	we	must	step	carefully	so	as	to	not	beg	any	questions,	particularly	against	the	structural	realist!	First	of	all,	we	must	appropriately	characterise	the	relationship	between	Permutation	Symmetry	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics,	the	nature	of	which	is	captured	by	the	Pauli	Exclusion	Principle	that	features	in	the	above	explanation	of	the	halting	of	white	dwarf	collapse.	There	is	a	range	of	devices	in	the	metaphysicians’	‘toolbox’	(French	and	McKenzie	2012)	that	we	might	utilise	to	capture	the	nature	of	this	relationship	but	some	can	be	shown	to	be	unfit	for	purpose	in	this	particular	case	(McKenzie	forthcoming;	Wolff	2012).	As	an	alternative,	we	might	deploy	the	determinable-determinate	relationship	(Wilson	2017),	with	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	understood	as	the	determinate	of	Permutation	Symmetry,	construed	as	the	relevant	determinable	(French	2014).	We	can	even	formalise	this	relationship	in	such	a	way	as	to	capture	the	idea	of	the	determinate	‘belonging’	to	the	determinable	(Denby	2001).		 This	then	captures	the	sense	in	which	the	relevant	symmetry	plays	the	role	of	a	boundary	condition	as	mentioned	above	–	we	exist	in	a	world	bounded	by	the	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	sectors	of	Hilbert	space.	However,	this	still	
leaves	the	further	question:	how	does	the	fact	that	electrons	are	fermions	and	subject	to	the	Exclusion	Principle	explain	the	halting	of	the	star’s	collapse?	Skow,	for	example,	takes	the	phrase	‘degeneracy	pressure’	seriously,	arguing	that	we	can	extend	the	meaning	of	‘pressure’	from	that	of	the	impact	of	gas	atoms	on	some	container,	to	that	of	the	resistance	that	results	from	electrons	occupying	the	relevant	quantum	states	(Skow	2014).	However,	given	that	the	‘action’	of	the	Exclusion	Principle	cannot	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	any	of	the	known	fundamental	forces,	it	is	clear	that	such	an	extension	effectively	releases	the	meaning	of	the	term	from	its	causal	moorings	(French	and	Saatsi	2018.,	p.	192).	Strevens,	on	the	other	hand,	suggests	that	the	relationship	between	the	Exclusion	Principle	and	the	halting	should	be	understood	as	some	kind	of	metaphysical	dependence,	as	in	the	case	of	Permutation	Symmetry	above	(Strevens	2008,	p.	178).	However,	in	this	case	we	do	have	the	kind	of	asymmetry	we	associate	with	dependence,	unlike	the	relationship	between	Permutation	Symmetry	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics,	in	that	the	halting	of	the	collapse	of	the	white	dwarf	star	is	dependent	on	the	action	of	the	Exclusion	Principle	and	not	vice	versa.	Of	course,	you	might	find	this	too	‘thin’	a	characterisation,	as	compared	to	a	causal	relationship	but	here	a	structural	realist	might	suggest	that	this	thinness	is	a	result	of	the	metaphysical	proximity	of	the	two	relata:	for	her,	the	observed	halting	and	the	Exclusion	Principle	are	both	features	of	the	structure	of	the	world,	conceived	à	la	Cassirer	as	indicated	above.			 There	is	more	to	say,	of	course	but	I	would	maintain	that	Permutation	Symmetry	can	be	said	to	‘produce’	the	appearances	associated	with	the	halting	of	the	collapse	of	white	dwarf	stars	in	a	way	that	meets	van	Fraassen’s	challenge.	However,	van	Fraassen	then	sharpens	the	problem	for	the	realist	by	posing	the	challenge	in	the	context	of	quantum	mechanics,	where	it	appears	in	the	form	of	the	infamous	‘measurement	problem’.		
The	Measurement	Problem		Thus	he	suggests	that,	‘…	the	Copenhagen	development	of	quantum	theory	exemplifies	a	clear	rejection	of	the	[Appearances	from	Reality]	criterion.’	(2008,	p.	291).	And	given	the	tremendous	success	of	the	theory,	under	that	interpretation,	we	should	then	be	wary	of	imposing	this	criterion	in	general.	If	the	realist	nevertheless	insists	on	accepting	it,	then	she	must	deal	with	the	measurement	problem,	which	van	Fraassen	characterises	as	follows:		Measurement	Problem:	the	quantum	theoretical	description	of	the	interaction	between	system	and	measurement	apparatus	provides	no	place	for	specific	outcomes		Putting	things	quite	bluntly,	quantum	mechanics	offers	an	inherently	probabilistic	description	(think	of	Schrödinger’s	Cat)	and	in	order	to	account	for	a	specific	measurement	outcome	(such	as	‘the	cat	is	alive’!)	something	further	must	be	added	to	the	theory,	where	by	virtue	of	being	extraneous	to	the	theory,	that	‘something	further’	goes	beyond	what	can	be	supported	by	the	physics	and	hence	can	be	contested.	I’ll	come	back	to	that	shortly	but	as	van	Fraassen	notes,	the	measurement	problem	is	not	an	issue	for	empiricists,	since	the	empirical	adequacy	of	the	theory	can	be	cashed	out	in	terms	of	the		‘…	surface	models	of	
phenomena	fit[ting]	properly	with	or	into	the	theoretical	models.’	(2008,	p.	305);	that	is,	we	have	matching	between	two	families	of	probability	functions.	From	this	perspective,	he	goes	on,	the	measurement	problem	represents	a	‘methodological	rejection’	of	the	Appearance	from	Reality	criterion	in	the	new	theoretical	context	of	quantum	physics.			 As	he	also	emphasises,	it	is	likewise	no	problem	for	physicists	who	(more	or	less)	happily	continue	with	their	theoretical	and	experimental	practices	without	(for	the	most	part)	worrying	about	the	problem.	As	Cordero	has	argued,	they	have	decoherence	to	thank	for	that,	which	introduces	an	‘…effectively	irreducible	"experimental	astigmatism”	’	(Cordero	2001).	‘Decoherence’	is	a	term	that,	very	broadly	speaking,	describes	the	‘loss’	of	quantum	behaviour	when	a	system	interacts	with	the	environment	As	a	result,	‘[a]spects	as	profound	as	those	regarding	the	group-theoretic	symmetries	are	untouched	by	the	debate	at	the	stochastic	level.	That	is,	above	a	certain	descriptive	depth	all	the	models	yielded	by	the	…	[various	interpretational]	approaches	converge	both	structurally	and	semantically	in	terms	of	effective	partial	isomorphisms	that	reach	deeply	into	the	respective	theoretical	fabrics	…’(ibid.,	p.	308).	In	effect,	then,	different	interpretations	of	the	theory	–	such	as	the	Bohm,	Everett	and	GRW	interpretations,	to	pick	the	more	well-known	–	share	a	thick	body	of	modeling	and	relevant	prior	knowledge	in	terms	of	which	the	outcomes	produced	by	the	sorts	of	particle	detectors	mentioned	above,	say,	can	be	understood.	Cordero	argues	that	this	yields	a	series	of		‘local	meanings’	of	the	theory	that	can	be	captured	via	partial	representations	involving	restricted	domains	that	in	turn	incorporate	limited	levels	of	theoretical	and	experimental	precision.	What	this	then	supports	is,	at	best,	a	‘restricted’	form	of	structural	realism	that	resonates	with	recent	moves	to	‘local’	forms	of	realism	(Saatsi	2017;	Vickers	2013).		These	in	turn	urge	us	to	limit	our	realist	commitments	to	those	that	are	specific	to	the	relevant	theoretical	situation	under	consideration			 Such	‘localised’	realism	is	not	necessarily	at	odds	with	the	structuralist	tendency	in	general,	especially	if	we	recall	the	core	motivation,	running	from	Cassirer	and	Eddington	to	Ladyman	and	current	accounts,	of	accommodating	certain	specific	features	of	twentieth	century	physics.	Alternatively,	however,	we	might	still	prefer	a	more	global	account	and	consider,	in	a	little	more	detail,	the	nature	of	that	‘further	element’	that	should	be	added	to	the	quantum	mechanical	description	in	order	to	satisfy	van	Fraassen’s	‘Appearances	from	Reality’	criterion.	The	hope	then	is	that	this	will	then	bridge	the	gap	between	the	probabilistic	description	offered	by	the	theory	and	the	specific	measurement	outcomes,	in	some	way	or	other.	As	we’ll	see,	this	can	be	done	but	only	at	some	cost.		 Let	us	begin	with	the	Copenhagen	development	of	the	theory,	as	mentioned	above.	As	is	now	well-known	the	label	was	actually	applied	in	the	1950s	(Beller	1999)	as	a	way	of	characterising	what	was	deemed	to	be	the	‘orthodoxy’;	indeed,	the	labelling	may	be	said	to	have	contributed	to	the	cementing	into	place	of	that	orthodoxy.	And	that	has	since	been	presented	in	broadly	instrumentalist	terms	that	are	amenable	both	to	physics	practice	and	empiricist	philosophy.	However,	prior	to	that	labelling	moment,	one	can	discern	distinct	strands	within	the	groups	of	physicists	most	commonly	associated	with	the	so-called	‘Copenhagen	Interpretation’,	offering	two	types	of	solution	to	the	measurement	problem	and	thus	two	ways	of	bridging	the	above	gap:	the	first	is	
associated	with	Bohr	and	appeals	to	the	‘classical’	nature	of	the	measurement	environment.	Again	putting	things	simply,	the	core	idea	here	is	that	we	are	compelled	to	describe	measurement	outcomes	in	classical	terms	and	hence	the	‘gap’	between	what	the	theory	says	and	specific	outcomes	isn’t	bridged	so	much	as	entrenched	in	a	fundamental	shift	from	one	kind	of	description	to	another.	All	we	need	to	do,	then,	is	make	sure	we	use	the	right	description	in	the	right	context.	As	is	well-known,	this	solution	came	under	intense	criticism,	not	least	on	the	grounds	that	as	it	continued	to	be	developed,	quantum	mechanics	was	actually	applied	to	broadly	‘macroscopic’	situations	for	which	‘classical’	physics	was	supposed	to	be	appropriate,	thus	undermining	the	force	of	the	‘compulsion’	to	use	classical	language	in	such	situations.	A	striking	and,	at	the	time,	forceful	example	of	this	is	the	development,	from	the	mid-1930s	onwards,	of	quantum	models	of	superconductivity	and	superfluidity,	led	by	the	London	brothers	(another,	presented	in	the	form	of	a	thought	experiment,	is	Schrödinger’s	Cat,	as	touched	on	earlier).			 The	second	strand	is	typically	associated	with	von	Neumann	and	is	generally	understood	as	resolving	the	measurement	problem	by	appealing	to	consciousness	as	the	‘extra	factor’.	This	bridges	the	gap	by	‘collapsing’	the	quantum	wave	function,	reducing	the	range	of	possible	outcomes	to	just	one.	Well-known	and	obvious	concerns	were	raised	about	this	proposal,	not	least	having	to	do	with	how	the	intervention	of	consciousness	could	‘cause’	the	wave	function	to	collapse	or	more	generally	close	the	gap	between	the	quantum	description	and	the	specific	measurement	outcomes.	However,	von	Neumann	himself	actually	wrote	very	little	on	the	role	of	consciousness	and	many	of	those	concerns	were	expressed	in	response	to	what	was	taken	to	be	a	summary	of	his	view,	written	by	London	and	Bauer	(1939).	As	it	turns	out,	this	was	no	mere	summary	but	presented	an	entirely	different	approach	that	drew	on	London’s	background	in	Husserl’s	phenomenology	(and	here	we	recall	Ryckman’s	contextualisation	of	Weyl’s	point,	acknowledged	by	van	Fraassen,	about	coordinate	systems	in	the	relativistic	context).	Instead	of	seeing	consciousness	as	some	extraneous	element	that	mysteriously	collapses	the	wave	function	and	thereby	accounts	for	specific	measurement	outcomes,	it	is	here	presented	within	an	understanding	of	quantum	mechanics	as	a	‘theory	of	knowledge’	in	general.	Within	that	framework,	the	wave	function	is	taken	to	describe	everything,	contra	Bohr,	and	it	is	the	separation	of	both	consciousness	and	the	system	under	consideration	from	the	superposition	through	a	phenomenological	act	that	yields	a	definite	measurement	result.	Hence	what	we	have	is	not	so	much	a	further	or	extraneous	element	imposed	from	outwith	the	theory,	as	it	were,	but	a	phenomenologically	grounded	expression	of	the	very	conditions	for	doing	science,	indeed	for	acquiring	knowledge,	in	the	first	place.	Within	this	framework,	the	measurement	problem	is	seen	as	no	‘problem’	at	all,	but	rather	as	an	acute	manifestation	of	the	nature	of	our	engagement	with	‘the	world’	that	can	only	be	properly	grasped	in	phenomenological	terms	(see	French	forthcominga).		It	was,	in	fact,	Wigner	who	effectively	appropriated	this	account	and	presented	it	in	terms	of	consciousness	mysteriously	producing	the	collapse	of	the	wave	function,	thereby	generating	all	the	concerns	that	ultimately	led	to	the	approach	in	general	being	widely	discarded.		 So,	when	it	comes	to	the	Copenhagen	development	of	quantum	theory	it	appears	we	have	(at	least)	three	variants:	Bohr’s	version,	with	a	classicality	
condition;	von	Neumann/Wigner’s	with	consciousness	as	the	cause	of	collapse;	and	London’s	with	the	theory	understood	from	a	phenomenological	perspective.	Only	in	the	second	case	do	we	have	a	specific	extraneous	element	that	is	introduced;	in	the	other	two	we	have,	rather,	the	articulation	of	conditions	for	applying	the	theory	or	acquiring	knowledge	more	generally.	In	whatever	case,	where	do	we	stand	with	the	Appearance	from	Reality	criterion?	Recall	that	the	requirement	is	that	the	appearances	should	be	explained	as	produced	in	the	world	depicted	by	the	physics.	Now,	if	the	mode	of	production	is	taken	to	be	mechanistic,	then	only	in	the	case	of	the	von	Neumann/Wigner	variant	could	we	say	that	the	requirement	is	met	and	then	only	contentiously	and	with	a	broad	understanding	of	‘mechanistic’.	With	that	meaning	of	‘produce’	on	the	table,	it	would	indeed	seem	that	when	it	comes	to	the	cases	of	the	Bohr	and	London	variants,	the	Appearance	from	Reality	criterion	has	been	set	aside.	However,	to	leave	it	at	that	would	be	to	ignore	the	role	of	the	further	conditions	which	are	introduced	in	each	case	–	a	classical/quantum	division	in	that	of	Bohr	and	a	fundamentally	phenomenological	framework	in	the	case	of	London.	It	is	certainly	not	the	case	that	‘the	theory’,	however	that	is	to	be	understood	(and	we’ll	come	back	to	this	issue	shortly),	yields	the	appearances	on	its	own.	In	either	case,	some	further	move	has	to	be	made	and	although	we	obviously	can’t	give	this	a	mechanistic	construal,	perhaps	we	can	take	some	liberties	and	acknowledge	such	a	move	as	a	form	of	production,	in	broadly	van	Fraassen’s	sense.	If	so,	then	it	would	seem	that	the	criterion	can	be	met,	and	in	an	interestingly	different	way	in	each	case.	However,	if	we	acknowledge	this,	there	is	the	further	question	to	be	answered,	as	just	touched	upon:	what,	then,	is	the	theory	of	quantum	mechanics?			 Recalling	Halvorson’s	critique	of	the	Semantic	Approach	that	we	began	with,	if	we	were	to	move	away	from	the	toy	examples	that	he	focuses	on	and	characterise	an	actual	theory	in	terms	of	families	of	models,	such	as	quantum	mechanics,	what	would	we	start	with?	Do	we	include	the	above	‘further	elements’	and	conditions?	In	Bohr’s	case,	presumably	not,	since	his	classicality	condition	can	be	understood	as	delineating	the	domain	of	applicability	of	‘the’	theory	but	in	the	London	case,	there	is	no	such	need	for	delineation;	rather,	it	is	only	when	we	see	‘the’	theory	from	the	phenomenological	perspective	that	we	can	account	for	the	appearances.	But	then,	what	do	we	take	‘the’	theory	to	be?		 Everett,	at	least,	was	clear	in	his	response	to	what	was	perceived	to	be	the	Copenhagen	orthodoxy.	Under	the	influence	of	Frank’s	‘empirical	pragmatism’	(Barrett	and	Byrne	2012,	p.	258)	he	maintained	that	a	theory,	in	general,	is	a	mathematical	model	with	a	homomorphism	holding	between	the	model	and	‘the	world’,	where	the	latter	could	either	be	taken	to	be	‘the	world	of	experience’	(i.e.	the	sense	perceptions	of	the	individual),	or	the	‘real	world’,		‘…	depending	upon	one’s	choice	of	epistemology	...’	(Everett,	in	Barrett	and	Byrne	2012,	p.	169).	Here	we	have	a	characterisation	that	obviously	meshes	with	the	Semantic	Approach,	but	with	homomorphism	selected	as	the	appropriate	formal	relation	rather	than	isomorphism	because	Everett	felt	that	not	only	was	the	theory	not	required	to	explain	all	of	our	experience	but	there	may	be	parts	of	the	model	that	are	not	interpreted	as	our	experience	(ibid.	p.	169,	fn	cq).	Crucially	for	the	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	that	he	proposed,	what	he	meant	by	‘experience’	here	were	memory	sequences	and	more	particularly,	those	that	were	‘typical’	(in	a	sense	that	when	technically	defined	gave	the	standard	quantum	statistics;	see	Barrett	2018).		
	 As	a	result,	Everett	insisted,	despite	the	kinds	of	concerns	that	underlie	the	challenge	represented	by	the	‘Appearance	from	Reality’	condition,	‘[t]he	theory	is	isomorphic	with	experience	when	one	takes	the	trouble	to	see	what	the	theory	itself	says	our	experience	will	be.’	(Everett	to	DeWitt,	in	Barrett	and	Byrne	2012,	p.	255).	Thus,	he	maintained,	what	he	called	‘pure	wave	mechanics’,	with	its	superpositions	of	states,	is	in	fact	‘empirically	faithful’	as	long	as	one	understood	that	there	has	to	be	a	‘renegotiation’	of	empirical	adequacy	in	the	context	of	theory	selection.	Now	of	course,	this	notion	of	faithfulness	offers	only	a	weak	empirical	standard	as	Barrett	has	noted	and	there	is	no	explanation	of	why	a	particular	sequence	of	records	should	be	regarded	as	‘typical’	(Barrett	2018).	Nevertheless,	Everett’s	account	does	show	how	the	appearances	might	be	obtained	from	the	fundamental	physics.	It	also,	crucially,	highlights	how	the	satisfaction	of	the	Appearances	from	Reality	criterion	assumes	implicit	prior	consideration	of	both	what	we	take	to	be	‘the’	theory	and	how	we	conceive	of	its	relationship	to	experience.		 Pressing	on	in	our	search	for	a	global	realist	response	to	van	Fraassen’s	challenge,	we	can	re-frame	this	account	in	broadly	structuralist	terms.	The	central	premise	of	(ontic)	structural	realism	aligns	with	Everett’s	overall	stance,	namely	to	take	quantum	mechanics	seriously	as	presenting	‘the	structure	of	the	world’.	For	the	Everettian	this	structure	has	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	‘branches’	within	the	framework	of	the	relative	state	formulation	but	in	a	sense	it	offers	too	much	structure.	Again,	some	further	feature	or	device	has	to	be	introduced	to	pin	down	the	relevant	aspects	of	that	structure	to	yield	our	experiences.	In	Everett’s	case	this	feature	is	the	relevant	memory	sequences,	with	measurement	outcomes	‘typically’	distributed	according	to	the	standard	quantum	probabilities.	Thus	this	amounts	to	‘what	the	theory	itself	says	our	experience	will	be.’	(Everett	to	DeWitt,	Barrett	and	Byrne	2012,	p.	255).	As	noted	above,	the	associated	empirical	faithfulness	may	seem	too	modest,	explanatorily	speaking.	In	that	case,	one	might	prefer	the	so-called	Deutsch-Saunders-Wallace	approach	which	introduces	decision	theory	as	the	further	element,	yielding	the	relevant	probabilities	via	reflection	on	the	choices	of	an	ideal	agent	(Wallace	2012).			 Again,	we	can	usefully	compare	such	‘further	elements’	to	those	indicated	above	when	it	comes	to	the	different	variants	of	the	Copenhagen	Interpretation.	The	lesson	to	be	drawn	is	that	given	the	nature	of	what	Everett	called	the	‘mathematical	model’	sitting	at	the	heart	of	‘the’	theory,	something	further	has	to	be	added	to	the	mix,	whether	that's	consciousness,	or	typicality	or,	thinking	of	the	Bohmian	case,	some	privileged	‘hidden	variable’	such	as	position	or	some	kind	of	probability	‘field’	as	with	GRW,	or	a	reconceptualisation	of	quantum	mechanics	as	itself	a	theory	of	knowledge,	as	London	and	Bauer	maintained.	All	of	these	features	or	moves	can	be	understood	as	enabling	the	‘production’,	perhaps	understood	broadly,	of	the	appearances	from	the	physics.	And	crucially,	then,	the	challenge	underlying	the	‘Appearance	from	Reality’	criterion	hinges	on	a	prior	decision	as	to	what	we	are	going	to	take	‘the’	theory	to	be.	That	decision	in	turn	hinges	on	‘…	what	explanatory	assumptions	one	has	an	obligation	to	include	in	one’s	specification	of	a	theory.’	(Barrett	preprint,	p.	16).	In	particular,	if	one	feels	that	one	is	not	obliged	to	include	any	of	the	above	elements,	moves	or	frameworks	in	one’s	specification	of	quantum	theory	then	‘the’	theory	by	itself,	as	it	were,	cannot	meet	van	Fraassen’s	requirement.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	one	
takes	these	features	precisely	to	be	the	kinds	of	explanatory	assumptions	that	should	be	part	of	the	specification,	then	the	challenge	can	be	met,	but	with	obvious	costs,	not	only	for	each	case	but	also	globally,	with	the	blossoming	of	a	multiplicity	of	different	quantum	‘theories’.	And	lest	you	think	that	this	is	just	underdetermination	redux,	compare	and	contrast	Everett’s	‘pure	wave	mechanics’	plus	typicality	with	London’s	phenomenologically	based	conception	of	quantum	mechanics	as	a	theory	of	knowledge	–	can	these	usefully	be	regarded	as	merely	different	interpretations?			 It	seems,	then,	that	we	have	something	of	a	dilemma:	either	we	exclude	such	explanatory	assumptions	from	our	specification	of	‘the’	theory,	and	then	bite	the	empiricist	bullet	when	it	comes	to	obtaining	the	appearances	from	reality,	or	we	introduce	some	such	assumption	and	accept	both	the	local	and	global	costs.	In	seeking	a	way	forward,	let	us	return	to	Halvorson’s	critique	of	the	Semantic	Approach.	We	recall	that	van	Fraassen’s	response	was	to	emphasise	the	significance	of	the	representational	function	of	theories.	Here	the	example	of	the	Mona	Lisa	was	invoked	and,	as	we	noted	above,	scientific	theories	are	typically	compared	with	paintings	in	discussions	about	representation,	not	always	appositely.	And	indeed,	more	generally,	theories	are	not	like	paintings	in	certain,	obvious,	ways	–	they	are	not	physical	objects,	for	example.	This	is	clearly	fundamental	when	it	comes	to	the	evaluation	of	the	faithfulness	of	the	representation	in	each	case.	Furthermore,	it	is	not	just	that	a	theory	cannot	be	identified	with	a	particular	presentation	of	it,	in	a	particular	‘mode’	or	language,	say.	We	would	not	want	to	say	that	Newtonian	mechanics	expressed	in	French	is	a	different	theory	from	that	expressed	in	English.	Likewise,	many	would	be	reluctant	to	claim	that	the	Special	Theory	of	Relativity	as	expressed	in	Einstein’s	1905	paper	in	terms	of	clocks	and	rods	is	a	different	theory	from	the	formulation	presented	in	terms	of	Minkowski	space-time,	although	that	might	be	more	contentious	that	the	Newtonian	case.	Indeed,	it	is	these	kinds	of	‘intuitions’	that	motivate,	in	part,	the	Semantic	approach	–	if	theories	are	to	be	identified	with	anything	at	all	(and	again,	that’s	a	big	‘if’),	they	should	be	identified	with	something	that	transcends	language.		 Alternatively,	theories	have	been	compared	with	other	forms	of	art,	such	as	works	of	music.	Popper,	famously,	placed	both	theories	and	musical	works	in	his	‘World	Three’,	the	world	of	‘intelligibles’;	that	is,	the	products	of	the	human	mind	(whereas	World	One	is	the	world	of	physical	states	and	World	Two	is	that	of	mental	states).	This	encourages	the	view	that	they	are	in	some	sense	abstract	entities,	or,	perhaps,	abstract	artefacts	as	Thomasson	has	suggested,	created	and	sustained	by	certain	intentions	(Thomasson	2006).	The	worry	here	is	not	only	do	such	views	offer	an	inflated	ontology	but	they	face	a	number	of	challenges	in	terms	of	accommodating	the	kinds	of	heuristic	moves	that	can	be	identified	and	traced	in	scientific	practice	(see	French	forthcomingb).			 There	is	a	further	alternative	to	all	these	sorts	of	accounts	that	avoids	having	to	introduce	new	worlds,	or	abstract	artefacts	or,	indeed,	any	further	ontological	commitments	at	all.	It	also	allows	us	to	escape	the	above	dilemma	and	effectively	sidesteps	the	need	to	proscribe	identity	conditions	for	theories	that	the	likes	of	Halvorson	demand.		We	simply	deny	that	theories	are	the	sorts	of	‘things’		that	have	identity	conditions	at	all,	whether	abstract	artefacts,	denizens	of	World	Three	or	whatever.	Here	we	also	recall	van	Fraassen’s	quote	from	before:	'...	if	theories	are	to	be	reified	…	then	a	theory	should	be	identified	
with	its	class	of	models.'	(van	Fraassen	1989,	p.	222).	As	I’ve	said,	that's	a	big	‘if’	and	what	is	being	suggested	here	is	that	we	bluntly	decline	to	affirm	the	antecedent.	One	way	of	making	good	on	this	is	simply	to	deny	that	there	‘are’,	in	whatever	sense,	theories	at	all	(French	and	Vickers	2011).	Of	course	we	may	say	things	that	are	apparently	about	theories,	such	as	‘quantum	mechanics	is	our	most	empirically	successful	theory’	or	‘quantum	mechanics	is	elegant’	but	that	should	not	be	taken	to	imply	that	what	makes	these	statements	true	is	some	
thing,	‘the’	theory	of	quantum	mechanics.	We	can	adopt	the	eliminativist	strategy	of	taking	something	else	as	the	truthmakers	of	such	statements,	such	as	the	various	practices	engaged	in	by	physicists	(and	philosophers,	as	we’ll	see;	French	and	Vickers	ibid;	French	forthcomingb).				 So	what	makes	the	statement	‘quantum	mechanics	is	our	most	empirically	successful	theory’	true	are	a	range	of	practices	associated	with	experimental	work,	as	well	as	with	modelling	and	theoretical	manipulation.	Of	course,	in	articulating	that	sense	of	empirical	success	we	will	have	to	address	the	kinds	of	issues	that	Everett	tried	to	tackle	and	that	underpin	the	Appearance	from	Reality	criterion.	So	we	should	include	among	those	practices	the	broadly	reflective	practices	of	the	likes	of	Everett,	as	well	as	London,	von	Neumann	and	others,	that	involve	thinking	about	selecting	‘typical’	memory	sequences,	or	the	insertion	of	consciousness	into	our	framework	or	even	taking	‘the’	theory	to	be	a	theory	of	knowledge	under	the	phenomenological	understanding.	As	for	‘quantum	mechanics	is	elegant’,	we	can	cash	this	out	in	terms	of	some	combination	of	parsimony	and	power	and	take	the	statement	to	be	made	true	by	the	relevant	practices,	involving,	for	example,	the	ease	of	deduction	of	certain	statements	from	the	axioms	or	fundamental	claims	of	the	theory,	the	way	in	which	a	wide	variety	of	claims	(both	theoretical	and	empirical)	can	be	obtained	from	these	axioms	and	so	on	(French	forthcomingb).			 This	eliminativist	stance	avoids	a	bloated	ontology	but	potentially	at	the	cost	of	rendering	problematic	our	understanding	of	theories	as	representations.	Now	we	face	yet	another	question:	how	can	something	that	is	not	a	thing	represent	something	else?!	The	answer	is	to	acknowledge	that	when	we,	whether	scientists	or	philosophers	of	science,	make	claims	about	theories	fulfilling	a	representational	role	we	have	a	certain	construct	in	mind.	We	may	then	present	that	construct	to	one	another,	via	symbols	scribbled	on	paper	or	the	whiteboard,	or,	particularly	if	we	are	philosophers,	via	some	framework	such	as	that	offered	by	the	Semantic	Approach.	However	the	models	of	the	latter	are	neither	to	be	identified	with	the	theory	nor	to	be	taken	as	representing	that	theory	as	an	entity,	whether	abstract	or	not;	rather,	they	should	be	seen	as	devices	that	we,	philosophers	of	science,	can	deploy	to	(meta-)represent	those	aspects	of	scientific	practice	we	are	interested	in.	At	that	(meta-)level	we	can	then	introduce	partial	isomorphisms	and	the	like	to	capture	the	relevant	representational	function	holding	between	‘the	theory’	(meta-characterised	in	terms	of	a	family	of	models)	and	the	given	system	(also	meta-characterised	in	terms	that	allow	for	such	a	relation	to	be	taken	to	hold;	see	French	forthcomingb).			 Expressing	it	in	those	terms	raises	an	obvious	worry	for	the	realist,	but	I	want	to	emphasise	that	to	deny	the	existence	of	theories	as	things	is	not	to	deny	the	existence	of	things	apparently	referred	to	by	those	theories.	We	should	not	allow	our	eliminativism	to	bleed	across	from	our	stance	on	theories	to	our	stance	
towards	the	world.	Nevertheless,	we	might	well	have	good	reason	to	be	a	certain	kind	of	eliminativist	in	the	latter	case	also.	Consider:	certain	scientific	practices	running	throughout	twentieth	century	physics	emphasise	and	illuminate	the	role	of	symmetries	and,	as	indicated	above,	this	has	been	one	of	the	prime	motivating	forces	behind	structuralism,	from	Cassirer	and	Eddington	to	Ladyman.	Viewed,	realistically,	as	saying	something	about	the	world,	we	can	take	structuralism	and,	in	particular,	the	fundamental	role	granted	to	symmetries,	as	implying	the	elimination	of	elementary	particles	as	things,	with	statements	apparently	about	them	made	true	by	features	of	the	structure	of	the	world	(French	2014).			 However,	that's	a	whole	other	set	of	issues	and	one	can	(and	should)	be	an	eliminativist	about	theories	while	adopting	any	of	a	range	of	stances	and	positions	within	those	stances	towards	the	ontology	of	the	world.	Having	said	that,	it	should	now	be	apparent	that	there	is	a	certain	parallel	between	the	issue	of	‘pinning	down’	the	structure	of	the	actual	world	and	that	of	satisfying	the	Appearance	from	Reality	criterion.	With	regard	to	the	former,	we	noted	that	the	mathematical	description	of	these	symmetries	yields	surplus	structure	that	goes	beyond	what	we	need	in	practice.	So,	again,	the	group-theoretic	description	of	Permutation	Symmetry	yields	forms	of	quantum	statistics	that	do	not	seem	to	be	relevant	to	our	world.	Thus	we	need	to	pin	down	that	structure	to	the	actuality	and	understand	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	as	‘existential	witnesses’,	in	Wilson’s	sense.	Likewise,	as	we’ve	just	considered,	when	it	comes	to	quantum	mechanics	we	have,	in	a	sense,	too	much	structure	and	we	need	to	introduce	some	further	element	or	device	to	yield	the	appearances,	whether	that	be	‘typicality’,	the	precepts	of	decision	theory,	consciousness	or	whatever.	In	both	cases,	it	seems,	we	have	to	engage	in	a	kind	of	‘Act	of	Self-Location’	as	a	form	of	making	concrete	the	abstract	structural	forms	that	the	mathematics	offers	us.			
Final	Remarks	Of	course,	these	moves	of	‘pinning	down’	the	structure	and	establishing	‘existential	witnesses’	are	fallible	and	revisable	across	a	range	of	respects	and	degrees.	Thus,	nothing	said	here	goes	against	van	Fraassen’s	insistence	that	‘…	we	have	the	freedom	to	follow	the	contemporary	abstract	structural	forms	now	prevalent	in	the	advanced	sciences	…’	(2008,	p.	267).	Indeed,	exercising	that	freedom	is	a	source	of	significant	scientific	development.	Consider	Dirac’s	famous	equation	in	relativistic	quantum	mechanics:	putting	things	very	simply,	from	a	mathematics	perspective	this	has	both	positive	and	negative	energy	solutions.	The	latter	might	be	understood	as	constituting	‘surplus’	structure	that	can	be	dismissed	as	non-physical,	thereby	‘pinning	down’	the	physical	solutions.	However,	as	is	well	known,	and	again	summarising	things	rather	crudely	(for	more	details	see	Bueno	and	French	2018,	Ch.	7),	Dirac	exercised	the	freedom	that	van	Fraassen	mentions	and	interpreted	this	particular	surplus	structure	in	terms	of	what	we	now	understand	as	anti-matter.	As	Redhead	emphasised	many	years	ago,	we	can	find	this	exploration	and	interpretation	of	surplus	structure	time	and	again	in	the	history	of	physics	(Redhead	1975).	Sometimes	it	pays	off,	as	in	Dirac’s	case	and	sometimes	it	doesn’t,	as	when	quarks	were	briefly	characterised	as	paraparticles.	In	both	cases,	however,	we	can	see	the	‘pin’	sliding,	as	it	were,	across	the	structures	that	are	available.	Indeed,	we	can	perhaps	see	that	history	as	a	series	of	such	explorations	together	with	
appropriate	‘pinning	down’	to	yield	descriptions	of	either	–	depending	on	your	stance	–	how	the	world	is	or	how	it	could	be.	And,	I	would	insist,	what	we	should	focus	on,	when	it	comes	to	the	philosophy	of	science,	are	the	practices	associated	with	these	moves,	and,	returning	to	the	opening	remarks	of	this	essay,	what	we	should	acknowledge	is	the	diversity	of	devices	that	we,	as	philosophers	of	science,	can	deploy	to	make	sense	of	these	practices.			
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